Myitkyina | 10th Air Force | China Burma India

FORWARD ECHELON

HEADQUARTERS TENTH AIR FORCE

U. S. ARMY

A.P.O 487

THE FALL OF MYITKYINA

as Observed by General Randall

Commanding the Fwd. Ech., 10th A. F.

Myitkyina, Japan’s chief base in Northern Burma, fell to combined American and Chinese forces August 3, 1944, thus ending one of the bloodiest and most prolonged sieges of the 1944 Burma campaign.

Japanese troops occupied Myitkyina June 7, 1942, following up the Allies’ withdrawal from Burma that spring. Eventually enemy lines in Northern Burma were established far north of Myitkyina, at Singbwiyang in the Hukawng Valley and at Sumprabum in The Triangle.

Starting in November 1943, General Stilwell’s Chinese forces attacked the Japanese in the vacant of Shingbwiyang and after several months’ fighting forced the Japanese out of the Hukawng Valley. Thereupon the campaign entered a new phase, its goals becoming the capture of the important bases of Kamaing and Mogaung in the Mogaung Valley and Myitkyina, northern terminus of the Burma railway.

Meanwhile a regiment of American infantry, known as Galahad or Merrill’s Marauders, had joined the Chinese Army in Burma; also the British had made an airborne landing in the rear of the Japanese forces in the area of Broadway and White City (area 50-80 miles South and West of Myitkyina).

While the bulk of the Chinese army pressed down upon Kamaing and a British force converged upon Mogaung, Merrill’s Marauders and three regiment of Chinese began to march from the Hukawng Valley across the hills, intending to take Myitkyina by surprise.

Their arrival at Myitkyina was a surprise. Quickly that day, May 17th 1944, the West air strip, most valuable prize in Northern Burma, was seized, cleared of enemy wreckage to prevent landings, and gliders and transports rushed in fresh troops and supplies.

It is the authoritative belief that Myitkyina should have fallen completely the night the air strip was captured, so great was the confusion of the enemy. However, Merrill’s forces were spent, and they were unable to press their initial surprise and capture the town. Two Chinese forces that night mistook each other for Japs, and before the mistake was learned some 40 plus casualties had been suffered. They pulled out, leaving the Japs to consolidate and take over strong defensive positions.

From then until August 3rd the siege of Myitkyina went on.

Had the Japs vigorously counterattacked at first instead of consolidating defensive positions the Allies would have probably lost the West landing strip, thus denying the Americans and Chinese a valuable area on which to pour in quickly reinforcement and supplies.

Once the strip was secured, the Gap garrison was doomed, as the Allies with complete mastery of the air could develop their lines into an overwhelming force.

The Jax garrison, however, received some reinforcements and supplies and held tenaciously to front lines only a thousand yards from the strip.

Air operations were stepped up from landing 25 aircraft a day in late May to a July peak of 551 landings and take-offs in one day. This constituted practically a landing or take-off once every minute. This was on a strip only 50 feet wide and 4200 feet long with engineers constantly working to keep it in operation and making improvements. After say three or four planes would land, a truck would dash on to the runway followed by a grader and roller - dump its load - race off the runway followed by the allied equipment just in time to escape being run down by successive landing or take-offs. The monsoon weather kept the strip in an almost flooded condition while the surrounding parking areas were never free of mud. Air operations were under most arduous conditions.

I first landed at Myitkyina July 24th.

Japanese forces were estimated at roughly 500 men.

The Allied ground forces on the front at that time consisted of the following:

Galahad had… … on the North, with the Irrawaddy River anchoring their left flank and the Sumprabum road on their right;

The U.S. … and … Combat Engineers … South of Galahad on the Sumprabum road;

The Chinese … … on the West;

On the South the Chinese … … with lines extending to the Irrawaddy.

To assist the infantry were the Myitkyina Task Force Corps Artillery and the close-in ground support furnished by the Tenth Air Force. Artillery consisted of … … , … …, and … … howitzers. Four of the 75’s had been air-dropped to Galahad on the march through the hills while the other weapons, including 2 155 mm howitzers were brought to the strip by air transports.

At the start of the battle practically all close-in support was furnished by fighter squadrons from Hukaung Valley strips, and in June a flight of fighters was based on the Myitkyina West strip, taking over the bulk of close-in work.

Air support from May 17 to June 1 consisted of … ship overlapping patrols; from June 1 to the middle of July, overlapping patrols of … aircraft from dawn to dusk. These ships … from the … Fighter Squadron moved into the Myitkyina West strip, primarily for giving close ground support and also to protect the field from Japanese aircraft.

Prior to the flight moving into Myitkyina, all targets for close support were given by G-3 or the Task Force to the air-ground support radio team of the First Tactical Air Communication Squadron, then relayed to aircraft over Myitkyina town. All of these targets were located on the gridded mosaic of Myitkyina which had been given general distribution to all air and ground forces participating. This worked fairly well but was not satisfactory for targets close to the front lines, and later the A-3 of the Forward Echelon assigned all targets to fighter units.

On July 9th the Forward Echelon of the Tenth Air Force moved from Tingkawk Sakan to Myitkyina and brought with them a flight of … … and a small photo lab from the … Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron. Close liaison was immediately established between the air and ground commands.

The … of the … Tactical Squadron made daily photo coverage of areas immediately in front of our lines, and with these photos the pilots of the … Squadron were briefed in pin-point targets. These targets were as close as 25 yards from our own troops.

Large quantities of photos were printed by the laboratory and given distribution to all concerned. Without these photos such extremely close support could not have been possible, nor could target as close to the front lines have been assigned had not the dive bombing accuracy of the fighters been as superior as it was.

During the latter part of July, 222 B-25 sorties were flown over Myitkyina town by the … Bombardment Squadron and … Bombardment Group. Their targets were enemy supply and troop concentrations in the center of the town. Prisoners of war declared the effect of this mass bombing was devastating and terrible to morale. Many prisoners of war stated that the unrestricted operations of our air forces caused their defeat.

The … flight operated from the South end of the strip where the mud was so heavy the planes had to be parked on the end of the runway. This constant hazard for landing and taking off could not be corrected until the fall of Myitkyina town.

These planes were used all day on ground support missions to wipe out the enemy strong points, dugouts, and revetments. Also they were ready at all times to defend the strip against enemy aircraft. Air raids could be expected at any time. Also while flying over their targets these craft were subjected to enemy small arms and machine-gun fire from within the town.

It was decided to use “Fire Bombs” on the enemy especially against points of resistance close to our ground troops. These fire bombs were improvised as follows: By filing a 75 gallon belly tank with a pre-tested mixture of oil and gasoline; scraping on two igniters to the fastening lug and dropping from any altitude. Although some difficulty was experienced initially in getting proper ignition, as explained in a complete report on this method of bombing the later results were considered excellent. On July 28th four bombs dropped on buildings directly in front of the Chinese … … from which machine-gun fire was coming. Several of these buildings were fired, the initial fire blast neutralizing the enemy fire therefrom. The second mission of this type in the same area was observed by Lt. Gen. Giles who flew over the combat area wit me in a liaison pane.

On the third flight, same day, Brig. Gen. Wessels, Ground Task Force commander accompanied me and observed four direct hits on bashas reported to contain enemy troops and supplies. The first bomb struck a basha and set it violently aflame. We saw four or five Japs run out from between it and a basha to its rear. They ran into a third house just as a fighter placed a direct hit with a fire-bomb on it. Nothing emerged and this basha burned severely for almost two hours, indicating it was full of stores. The following days until August 3rd over 100 of these fire bombs were used. In many cases the Japs would emerge from the burning area running from coverage and the ground troops would machine-gun them down. Many strong points were cleared for the Galahad forces who generally advanced vigorously after the bombing.

Each day saw some tightening of the noose about Myitkyina, the Galahads to the North and the Chinese … … on the South doing almost all of the attacking. Each night a larger number of Japs were captured or shot while trying to escape by raft down the river. Most of these were sick and wounded.

It was apparent by the first of August that the besieged garrison was trying to evacuate. The strong points scattered about were still hard to wipe out because of desultory attacks by the Chinese. It became necessary to kill practically all Japs in dugouts and pill-boxes for they stayed there - firing until killed.

On August 1 the Galahad force captured the last 75 mm gun in Sitapur, the Northern edge of Myitkyina - the lines were slowly pushing the Japs to the river. On the opposite side of the Irrawaddy the British were pushing down very slowly from the North and two battalions of the … division were moving up from the South to take Waingmaw. It is believed however that Japs escaped Eastward into the hills each night.

On August 1 and 2 many more Burmese escaped and came through the lines where there were interrogated and interned.

On august 3rd all forces except the Chinese … … moved forward vigorously and by nightfall Myitkyina had fallen. A group of 20 Japs threw down their rifles and jumped into the river at the last moment. All were killed like sitting ducks by rifle and machine-gun fire from the banks. Several groups committed hara-kiri by their own knives or shooting. One Jap in the Gap hospital hung himself by simply tying a rope around his neck to a bamboo upright and then sagging at the knees until he died.

Organized resistance had ceased West of the Irrawaddy River but snipers and small groups had to be killed or captured for the following three days. Even twelve days later individual Japs were found hiding in holes.

Myitkyina however had fallen and the second airstrip was now available to develop for increased traffic across the Hump and the safety of our Myitkyina base was now secure from ground attack.

The Fall of Myitkyina

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