NARRATIVE OF EVENT IN MALAYA AND THE PHILIPPINES

(as reported by observers)

PREFACE

The following is a summation of the information contained in lectures delivered by observers recently returned from the Philippines and Malaya. The substance of their remarks is summarized under three general headings—-Section I: Narrative of Events. Section II: Tactics, Characteristics, and Weapons. Section III: Miscellaneous Notes.

Section I: Narrative of Events

(a) Philippines.

(b) Malaya.

a. Philippines. ON the morning of December 8 (December 7th in Hawaii) at 3:30 A.M., a flash was received that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. This was immediately transmitted to the Admiral who took steps to disperse and otherwise protect the fleet elements. At 12:00 noon that day the Air Corps in the Philippines was caught on the ground by a heavy Japanese air attack and thus, in the opinion of the observer, the chance for a successful defense of the Philippines was lost at the start. Just how or why the Air Corps was caught on the ground the observer did not know beyond the fact that the planes were assembled and being prepared for a possible offensive move when verification was received of the flash about the Pearl Harbor attack.

The Jap attacking planes were located by radar as they came south off the West Coast of the Philippines until opposite Manila, and then turned at right angles and came in to deliver the blow that destroyed the offensive power as well as crippled the defensive power of the Philippine Air Force.

The initial Japanese landing at Apari, Legaspi, and other points south and east of Luzon were unopposed; in at least one case the Jap ships came in flying the American flag with people at the dock to meet them. The first landing which was opposed took place at Lingayen. Here the Japs landed at the poor landing beaches, avoiding the good landing places. They used a peculiar formation, the transports coming into Lingayen Gulf within 2,000 yards of the shore under the support of naval fire from warships further offshore. This landing was opposed principally by artillery which did a good job, and if there had been more of it might have prevented a successful landing. Effective artillery fore was delivered against the landing boats and transports; shots were observed in some instances to knock the landing boats off their davits before or during the time they were being launched. Landing boats had some armored protection. After suffering rather heavy casualties the Japs forced their landing, and began the drive toward Manila. The Filipino forces were not sufficiently strong or well trained to do more than delay their … (much of the following text was unreadable…)… _____________Filipino scouts gave a fine _____________ Filipino troops did not show up __________ Japanese success ___ their air superiority.

______________ from opposite directions from _______. General MacArthur declared Manila an open city and ordered a withdrawal into the Bataan Peninsula. Was successfully accomplished but not without great difficulty. In the meantime the Japanese ____ struck Cavite, and their formation bombing from a height of about 24,000 feet was very accurate and destructive. On General MacArthur’s orders, military stores of value to the Japanese were destroyed, and all non-Navy air corps, marines and others of military age - were collected in Bataan where they occupied previously selected positions along a defensive line across Bataan south of Subic Bay.

This first line was penetrated by a Japanese attack against its center. They drove thru, taking artillery with them, over ground which was largely undefended because it was considered impassable. A retirement to a new line therefore became mandatory and the army corps on both flanks of the penetration dropped back to a new line which was held until the end, altho a penetration was made through its center, too. This penetration was pushed through without adequate flank protection, however, and the entire penetrating force was cut off and destroyed by a coordinated counter-attack.

The Japs attempted flanking movements by sea, always choosing extremely difficult places to land - in fact landing in paces where it had been previously thought no landings could be made. One such effort was largely destroyed before it reached shore, out of some 10 boats only one reaching shore, and it was quickly destroyed. On another occasion it was found that a landing had been made on the southern end of Bataan; the Japanese had come ashore at night and collected a considerable force in very rough terrain. This force was finally isolated on one point jutting out into the sea, and were there destroyed to a man. In another place the Japs succeeded in getting men ashore who took refuge in caves. This the place where the American defenders lowered grenades on ropes in an effort to smoke the Japs out of the caves. They wer finally destroyed, but only after Filipinos had gone into the caves after them. These Filipinos did a wonderful job, and just how they got the Japs may never be known beyond the fact that they did go in and killed them all.

The Japs, once they started a landing or an attack, came on with fatalistic determination. It was found that the landing boats in one attempt came in to land, each with a 5-gallon tin of gas which was just enough gas to get the boats ashore, but not enough to make a return trip —in other words they either landed or else.

The final fall of Bataan, however, was due to the physical exhaustion of the men produced by continual fighting over a long period of time combined with a shortage of rations where the food allowance had been reduced first to half rations and then to quarter rations. It was simply a case of ruching the physical limit of human endurance.

The 31st Infantry performed in a magnificent manner, being used in emergencies for counter-attacks to reestablish the lines. On one occasion they executed a counter-attack on one side of Bataan, and then marched across Bataan to counter-attack on the other side, all in one day. They suffered heavy casualties which were replaced with air corps, sailors, civilians—anyone who could bear arms.

Following the final penetration of our lines by the Japanese, every kind of boat was used to evacuate personnel to Corregidor, some men even swimming there. The Japs immediately laid siege to Corregidor, bringing their heavy artillery around to Marivales for that purpose. Considering the amount of shelling and bombardment of Corregidor, surprisingly little damage was done to installations and personnel. To repeat, it was lack of food and physical exhaustion from months of fighting without rest which finally resulted in the capture of Bataan and Corregidor.

The observer who made this report was in Manila at the time of the attack, fought through bataan, and eventually ran the blockade to leave Corregidor a short time before its fall.

b. Malaya. In Malaya it was not only a case of too little too late, but also a case of nothing ever. The British commanders estimated it would take 11 divisions to defend Singapore and Malaya; They had two Indian Divisions and one depleted division of Australians. They had been promised reinforcements. These reinforcements never arrived because they were not started until after the Japs attacked, and then were diverted on the high seas to Australia and India following the fall of Singapore.

The Japanese avoided defended areas in Malaya and made their landings, as usual, on difficult but undefended beaches. In the one place where they attempted to land against land defenses they suffered heavy casualties and were driven off.

The British commander had to decide between fighting a delaying action and a pitched battle. He chose a delaying action because of the heavy numerical superiority of the Japanese. He was greatly handicapped by lack of air support. Out of approximately 200 planes about 40 could not even get off the ground, and at least half of the others were of such obsolete types that British aviators coming in from England did not know how to fly them. It had been estimated that 500 first line panes would be required to defend Malaya.

The initial effort to stop the Japanese invasion was thus handicapped by lack of men, by lack of air… and the naval situation at this great sea base was also woefully inadequate. There were 4 old cruisers there, 2 of which had recently been in a head-on collision with each other. The recently arrived Prince of Wales and Repulse were thrown in against the invasion armada in what has often been criticized as a foolish effort. It has been erroneously reported this illustrated a lack of coordination between the air, ground and naval forces in Malaya. Such was not the case, however, and neither of these two criticisms are justified. The air, ground and naval commanders were in constant close cooperation preceding the war. It was unfortunate that a newly arrived admiral had reached Singapore only a week before the attack, and thus had not had time to become fully acquainted with the situation. This may have had some bearing on his decision to move the prince of Wales and Repulse against the Japanese invasion armada without air support. It is doubtful, either, very doubtful, that any air support available could have saved the two great warships which moved out in such a brave but vain effort against the Japanese invasion fleet. The danger of this move was fully understood but it was made with the knowledge that it was the only thing which might save Malaya from invasion. The air support called for by radio did not arrive because the planes failed to find the ships—which it is thought they would have been unable to save anyway. The Prince of Wales received 6 torpedo hits and Repulse possibly as many.

So the landings were made unopposed from the sea.

The British delaying action was fought with Indian troops, the Australian troops being held on the East shore of Malaya just north of the Johore Straits because political orders prevented their use in upper Malaya.

The conquest of Malaya is too recent to need repetition in detail beyond the fact that the Japanese pushed down the peninsula and captured Singapore. The tactics employed are of interest. These tactics followed the now familiar pattern of infiltrations and flanking movements, which were dependent upon superiority of numbers. The Japs fixed their opponents in place and still had enough men to work around the flanks. They also used a type of infiltration where individuals or small groups filtered through the lines and attacked the rear areas. In their advance down the Malaya Peninsula the Japanese used a succession of land and sea maneuvers where they continually went around the flanks and threatened the rear of British units, thus forcing their withdrawal. This maneuver, whether against a squad, battalion, regiment or division always followed the same general pattern.

The Japs were able to travel through jungles and over rough ground as fast or faster than the British on the roads; their mobility and endurance were remarkable. They flanked the Australian position by landing above it. In other words the execution of a flanking movement or an attempt to get in the read of their enemies is not merely a characteristic Japanese maneuver, it is their habitual method of attack. No terrain seems too difficult for them to traverse if it offers them the chance of employing their infiltration through-the-lines-round-the-l=-flank-to-the-rear method of attack.

By the time the British had retreated to the straits of Johore they were so exhausted, so depleted in strength, and so disorganized that they were no longer a coordinated fighting force. Casualties had been enormous, including many staff officers and unit commanders. The Japanese experienced little difficulty in forcing a crossing of the Johore Straits. As a matter of fact the straits were scarcely more of an obstacle than some of the rivers they had already crossed; with their engineer equipment and a large number of small boats picked up and brought along for that purpose, the Japanese quickly forced the straits of Johore and landed on Singapore Island in several places. Since the causeway of the Straits also contained the water main supplying all of the city of Singapore it was not possible to adequately destroy the causeway and once the straits were crossed the city of Singapore, as well as the defending forces, were then depended for water upon three small reservoirs on the island. These were quickly captured by the Japanese, which left the entire city of Singapore without water and thus undependable. Since a great naval base was on the northern part of Singapore Island, and thus in enemy hands, it was not only physically impossible to defend the city because there was no water, but with the capture of the naval base the chief reason for holding Singapore Island was gone.

Hence the quick capitulation.

In the Burma area the story was much the same. Too many men and too many airplanes against too few men and too few airplanes. This was further aggrivated by the unique delaying methods of the Burmese troops, which usually meant delaying in their positions until the arrival of the Japanese—and then they joined the Japanese, sometimes shooting their own officers in the process. Here, too, flanking troops reached the rear of the British lines, cut their line of withdrawal, and forced a disastrous retreat out of Burma over ground which made it impossible to save their equipment. It was in this action that a force of highly trained British equipped with the newest type of American medium tanks—which had originally been intended for Singapore-were lost. Thus the cutting of the Burma Road and the flanking movement against China became an accomplished fact.

c. East Indies. The Japanese attack against the East Indies quickly followed the conquest of Malaya and Singapore. Borneo, Sumatra, Java and the Celebes fell. In each case the story was the same, too little too late—and no adequate air support. An illustration will serve to show the tragedy of delay in safeguarding the routes of supply of airplanes for the defense of Java. Java was the primary Japanese objective, and thus was to be defended at all costs. To get airplanes to Java the big ones could be flown in from Australia, but the pursuit planes—the backbone of air power—had to be flown from Australia to a small island halfway, and there refueled for the remainder of the trip. General Wavell wanted this island defended but at first the Australians would not send troops from the Australian mainland. When they finally sent a force to defend the island refueling point it was too late-1,500 Japanese captured it before the arrival of the reinforcements. The result of this was that pursuit ships could longer fly from Australia to Java, which in turn left the flying fortresses on the ground without fighter support and thus they had to be withdrawn after a number of them were destroyed on the ground. This left the Java defenders without air support.

The lack of adequate air support was largely responsible for two things: first that, following the battle of the Java Sea, invasion forces approached Java unmolested; second, that reenforcement for Java were attacked at sea and scattered with the result that some of the ships landed at one end of Java and some at the other end. Since the ships were not tactically loaded, men and arms arrived at one place and the ammunition at another some 800 miles away. It was the identical mistake all over again of the British attack on the Dardanelles.

The Japanese then attacked by air the seaports at the easter and western ends of Java, which left one small port in Southern Java at which only two boats could be unloaded at one time. Therefore when a great convoy arrived off Java of approximately 100 vessels that had gone around Africa with reinforcements intended for Singapore, there was no place to unload it.

And so Java fell.

The observation has been made that the Japanese were over-extended in a thin line from Burma through Sumatra, Java, Celebes, Borneo, and the New Guinea. This is a fallacious assumption. The Japs had a great number of air fields forming a net with only 300-mile jumps between them. Reflection will show the Japanese actually were not over-extended because they could thus quickly concentrate their air anywhere. Besides this forward screen of islands to the south they aso had the Philippines, the Mandated Islands, and the China coast. There was thus no striking force within reach to hit this supposedly over-extended line. It is evident that no position is over-extended unless it is vulnerable to attack from a striking force. No such striking force existing, the Japanese were not then and are not now over-extended until such time as a striking force is assembled.

One of the fundamental characteristics of the Japanese attack, and of the positions they now hold as a result, is the manner in which air power has dominated the Far Eastern theatre of operations:

The destruction of our air force in the Philippines was their first objective, and succeeding in this, their command of the air eventually gave them the Philippines.

By air attack they struck a blow at our fleet and air power in Hawaii, immobilizing any possible relief expedition from that area.

By air power, using torpedo bombers, they sank the Prince of Wales and Repulse, thus enabling their Malaya invasion to land unmolested from the sea.

By heavy superiority in the air over Malaya the Japanese defeated the British delaying action and conquered Malaya and Singapore before reinforcements could arrive.

By cutting off the refueling point used to fly P-40’s to Java, the air defense there was crippled, and Java fell.

The lack of air power by the British and Chinese is now endangering China, as the Jap spearhead, with air superiority, pushes into China from Burma.

At the present writing the Japanese drive against Australia has been stopped through loss by the Japs of air superiority over the Australian Coast and adjacent waters.

Section II: Tactics, Characteristics, and Weapons

a. Tactics. Jap tactics are simple and never vary, though the method of applying the simple principles are varied in a great many ways. There is no limit to their treachery or to the variety of their subterfuges.

They always try to outflank any position they attack - or to attack it from the rear. This principle is used in unit varying in size from a squad to an army. Their so-called “infiltration” is primarily a flanking movement made possible because of superiority in numbers. They also attempt to push small units through the lines into the rear areas where they may wait one or two days in hiding before they start fighting, and they time their attacks in the rear areas with a frontal attack. Individual men climb trees and hide out as snipers, waiting for a chance to shoot an officer. Snipers usually tie themselves in the tree so that when shot they remain there with the result that firing still continues at a dead man.

The Japs push forward penetrations in frontal attacks and advance regardless of their flanks - which opens them up to being pinched off and destroyed of the defenders recognize the weakness of the Japanese penetration. There were a number of instances in the Philippines and Malaya where Jap penetrations were pinched off and destroyed to the last man.

Water, swaps, or mountainous ground will not necessarily protect your flanks agains Jap attacks. It seems that no ground is impassable for them to traverse if it enables them to take you unawares.

On Bataan the first defensive line taken up was penetrated straight through the middle over ground which in planning the defense had been considered impassable. This forced a retirement to a new line which was held until the end, but a penetration was also made through the center of this line. This time, however, the vulnerability of the penetration was recognized and it was pinched off and destroyed.

The Japs made several attempts to flank the Bataan line by water, landing in extremely inaccessible spots. These flanking movements were discovered and destroyed, but in one case they landed on the rear of Bataan at night and hid out in precipitous ground during the day waiting for their strength to be built up by more landings. Fortunately this was discovered in time and the flanking forces were attacked and isolated to a small point of ground where they were destroyed to the last man.

An interesting development was discovered when it was found that Japanese aviators had dropped messages to this beleaguered flanking party, telling them to swim out a certain distance to reach a current that would take them back to the Luzon Mainland 17 miles away. Some of them were captured clinging to bits of wreckage and trying to escape in this fashion.

In Malaya, British troops on the roads were continually flanked by Jap groups who travelled through the jungles at a speed faster than the British believed possible as a result British troop columns and rear areas were frequently attacked and thrown into confusion.

In one case two British columns in considerable strength were withdrawing along parallel roads. The Japs slipped through between the two forces and you 10 to 15 miles in their rear, striking the rear of one column and destroying it, then turning and d=striking the rear of the other column, also largely destroying it. The endurance and agility of the Japs were tremendous and the speed with which they moved in their continuous flanking tactics so exhausted the British and caused such heavy casualties that by the time they reached Singapore Island the British forces were no longer a coordinated fighting force.

The Japs made flanking movements by sea in Malaya similar to those they had attempted in Bataan. The British were thus continually forced to fight their way through Japs who had gotten behind them.

In Burma there was an instance where a mechanized column of Japs crossed from Thailand over a route considered absolutely impassable. Needless to say, they took the British in rear with the result that the English lost all their heavy equipment, including a mechanized unit equipped with new American medium tanks. The initial assault on Singapore Island succeeds when the invaders tossed the Straits and struck to the flanks over the worst possible ground - and succeeded in forcing a British withdrawal toward Singapore City. The surrender followed as stated in Section I, above.

The Japs avoid landings agains fortified positions if it is possible to land anywhere else. When they do land against fortified positions these landings are made at night and are pushed regardless of losses. The first landing groups push directly inland. They do not, at first, establish a beach head as we know it, nor do they necessarily land a large force initially, but may continue sending in small forces at night until they build up sufficient strength in small groups ashore to so harass the defenders from the rear that larger forces can be landed to seize a beach head.

Their first objective is always air fields.

It is a mistake, however, to consider the Japs as supermen and superior tacticians. Their successes have been due largely to superiority in numbers in the air and on the ground, against an enemy unprepared to meet them. The Japanese flanking movements, infiltration tactics, and penetrations on a narrow front have proved to be very vulnerable; when British or American commanders anticipated such movement and took prompt action against them, these unsupported spearheads were quickly destroyed.

The Jap road discipline with motor vehicles was poor and they suffered heavy losses from air attacks.

Their speed of movement was largely due to light equipment and elimination of all excess baggage - both individual and organizational equipment. Kitchen sections, as we know them, are non-existent in the Jap army. Their principal food is rice, which is simple to prepare or consumption, and is frequently cooked by the soldier himself in a small bucket carried for that purpose.

Their use of small caliber weapons means a light ammunition load, thus increasing their mobility as well as the amount of ammunition they can take with them.

Jap tactics follow a pattern which may be summed up as embodying as many of these points as possible:

(a) Superiority in numbers.

(b) Air superiority.

(d) Exploit any initial success by pushing on at top speed, which is increased by their excellent condition, light equipment, and an ability to live off the country.

NOTEL Their tactics in general follow the German Blitzkrieg principles with modifications to fit the country, the capabilities of their soldiers, and to exploit any weaknesses in the enemy positions, arms and equipment.

b. Equipment. Though he travels light the Jap soldier is well equipped. His uniform is not much different from ours, but you may find him dressed in almost anything from civilian clothes to our own uniform. He uses a small caliber rifle which leaves small wounds that are much less sever than those caused by our own .30 caliber. He also has a light machine gun of small caliber. A method of employing this light machine gun is for one many to carry it on his back while another follows behind him, the man carrying the gun will lean forward and the man behind will shoot it. This machine gun has a handle on it and can be carried like you would carry a handbag.

The Jap helmet is canvass covered, and frequently has a small camouflage net stretched over it.

Snipers are equipped with a large body camouflage net, and use rubber-sole shoes with the divided toe design for climbing trees. They also have a wire grill glare shade for their eyes.

Each man carries a small package of a powdered gas-decontaminating material for protection against gas.

The Japs carry individual water filters. One type is a time which has a rubber top with a filter pad in it, and another type is about the size of housewife with the proper medication inside to purify the water.

Jap grenades are so made that they can be thrown from a discharger, or they can be tapped and thrown by hand. The grenades can also be placed on the ground and used as small mines.

Each squad has a 780-foot length of rope. Their entrenching tools are made with two eye holes in them so that the shovel can be held in front of the face as a camouflaged screen, as well as affording some protection.

The individual man also has a variety of small personal articles including flashlight, pen, diary book, vitamin pills, first aid equipment - even laxatives.

The Japanese infantry has a 70-mm accompanying gun in addition to mortars and all calibers of artillery up to and including 240-mm.

Their landing boats are armored in front but are vulnerable to machine gun fire from the sides.

The Japanese officers were equipped with a sword, and used it.

The Japs used a magnetic mine which the individual soldier would keep in a fox hole until a tank came over it; he then would place the mine up against the belly of the tank where it would stick for a time and then explode after the tank had passed over the fox hole.

Their airplanes, including the famous “0” fighters, were flimsy and easily shot down if they were hit. While very maneuverable, they could not take the punishment of our own P-40’s which have been known to land safely with as many as 200 bullet holes in them.

In spite of report to the contrary the Japs are not suicidal maniacs. They want to live. Thus anti-aircraft fire not only greatly affected the accuracy of their bombing, but to some extent prevented it. At Corregidor it was observed that a bombing formation would fly over and when some of them were shot down the others would hastily drop their bombs and leave. But apparently they would be sent back again and again until most of the flight was destroyed. The Jap aviators did bomb hospitals on Bataan, and on at least one occasion machine gunned truckloads of prisoners from the air.

c. Characteristics. The Jap is not so small as he is reported and is by no means a weakling. He is tough and tireless and inured to hardships. Not only this, but his national standard of living is lower than ours and thus things that would hardships to us are normal to him. His mentality is not low but he lacks the education of the American soldier. He is cunning and treacherous and will fight to the last man, or move forward in an attack actuated by a fatalistic determination compounded from his peculiar religion and generation of existence where suicide was honorable and preferable to dishonor. To be captured is to be dead. Japanese style.

These statements appear somewhat contradictory with previous observations that the Jap was human and wanted to live. This is not the case, however, because a Jap is merely a hypocrite on a grand scale. With others to see, he will go on to this death, but otherwise he reacts quite differently. The Jap never commits suicide unless others are to find out and honor him for it - in fact the object of his suicide is for others to find it out. Proof of this is the fact that Japanese aviators can be turned aside from their targets by anti-aircraft fire, and also the fact that on Bataan an appreciable number of Japs came forward and individually surrendered. Watch a Jap, however, if he tries to surrender, because cases are known where Japs have come forward with both hands in the air, but when in close, tossed two hand grenades - one from each raised hand.

He is cruel, and the atrocities of Nanking and Hong Kong are too well documented to be doubtful. It is believed, however, that American military prisoners taken on Bataan were, according to Japanese standards, well treated - even thought there was that case where Jap aviators machine gunned their own trucks while they were loaded with American prisoners. This was undoubtedly an exhibition of a sort of military banditry which is potentially present throughout the Jap army and was responsible for the sinking of the Panay, the rape of Nanking and the atrocities of Hong Kong. It is something which we cannot understand because we have no parallel in our army.

Many Japs speak English and they have used this to advantage at night to deceive our troops.

Many of them also keep diaries and the diaries are a source of much information when found on the battlefield.

Your Jap is also trick and my prepare flashlights or fountain pens to explode when tampered with. They also have been known to attach mines to rifles left on the ground. Any object found in a trail should be treated with the respect due a booby trap.

The Japs used British bombers captured at Singapore to drop parachutists in a surprise attack on Java.

Be careful of their flag of truce. They will use it as a ruse.

Be careful about a Jap in a foxhole, because he may stay hidden there and then pop up to shoot you from the rear. In fact the Jap must always therefore be treated with the suspicion and care due a treacherous slant-eyed snake.

Section III: Miscellaneous Notes

The Filipino Scouts proved themselves wonderful soldiers when well led, and man for man were more than a match for the Japs. The partially trained and loosely organized Filipino army was not so well disciplined and was no match for the invaders; they were demoralized by Jap infiltration and flanking tactics, and bit on all booby traps.

In one case, a Filipino soldier, one of the regulars, was found dead facing 11 dead Japs, and lying across him was the body of a dead Jap officer who had himself been killed after attacking the valiant Filipino from the rear.

The manner in which Filipino Scouts went into certain caves on Bataan after the Japs will always be an example of the bravery and fighting quality present in the trained and disciplined Filipino soldiers. They hate the Japs and can be depended upon to rise against them at the first opportunity All Filipinos idolize MacArthur and look upon him in a way that can only be described as reverence.

Captain Wermuth, the legendary one-man army of Bataan, was all he is reported to have been. He was a walking arsenal. For his exploits Captain Wermuth was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross at least five times. He was finally shot through the body wit a bullet that missed his heart about an inch and his spine about half an inch. He took first aid treatment for his would but would no to the hospital - though the wound slowed him up.

When the penetration was made through the center of the first Bataan defensive line, over supposedly impassable ground, the Japs not only penetrate his area but took artillery with them. In the following withdrawal of American forces one of the American Corps lost much of its artillery, a loss which was felt later.

The 31st Infantry performed in a heroic manner, and suffered 195% casualties; replacements were obtained from air corps, quartermaster, and any others who were available. The 31st Infantry was used on difficult and important counter-attacks. When Bataan eventually collapsed it was a failure of men who had passed the limit of human endurance from fatigue, constant fighting, and lack of food until finally they were physically unable to move. It is not known exactly how the collapse came except that in moving to counter a Jap penetration two units failed to reach the appointed place at the appointed time.

Although Corregidor was subjected to constant shelling and bombing, it was surprising how little damage was done to personnel and installations. Again the final failure was due to lack of food and physical exhaustion by men who could stand no more.

In one case 600 shells were fired at Fort Drum by the Japs (Fort Drum is the “concrete battleship” constructed on a submerged rock foundation) and 200 hits were scored, but negligible damage resulted beyond blowing one anti-aircraft gun into the sea and damaging another.

In the final phase of the attack on Corregidor the Japs were using heavy artillery fire observed from the heights of Marevales. When the final assault came it was made under the direct support of artillery.

In Burma the natives did not offer the British the kin of support that the =Filipinos gave us in the Philippines. The only type of operations at which the Burmese troops were adept was in delaying actions where they delayed until the Japs arrived - and then joined the Japanese. In many cases they killed their British officers.

The Japs made good use of bicycles, small boats, and any other means of transportation left behind by the withdrawing British forces. Moral: It is not only necessary to destroy army equipment that may fall into Japanese hands, but anything of any nature which they might use. Im Malaya it is estimated that in their move south they collected some 1,000 small boats which were used in crossing the Straits of Johore.

In considering what has happened in the Far East, it is evident that while the Japs planned their campaign well and had heavy superiority in men and materiel, they have been aided greatly by the mistakes of those who fought against them.

The Japs are not supermen, mentally or physically, but they have taken advantage of the ground and the weaknesses of opponents who were not alert to prevent the success of the simple Jap tactics.

We should no longer present the spectacle of a man who is attacked in his sleep and cuffed about while still dazed with sleep. Our eyes are open, and there is no longer any excuse for schoolboy treachery and the attack from the rear to take us by surprise.

To be forewarned is to be forearmed - armed not only with weapons, but with knowledge of our opponent.

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