At the Quebec conference in the summer of 1943, it was decided that the reopening of a land out to China was essential. General Frank Merrill and General Stillwell, who both attended the conference, assured General Marshall that this could be accomplished with a regiment of American troops. They were promised that the American troops would be dispatched to CBI forthwith. Volunteers were called for from units in Trinidad, Panama, and the Southwest Pacific for “an extended and arduous mission to regain territory from the enemy.”

Transports left the west coast of the United States in August 1943, with jungle veterans from Trinidad and Panama aboard; they stopped at New Caledonia and Guadalcanal to pick up volunteers who were veterans of campaigns in New Georgia, New Caledonia, Munda, and Guadalcanal. Almost to a man they believed they were en route to the Philippines, so it came as somewhat of a surprise when they docked at Bombay in September 1943. They were then moved to a former British camp at Deolali, approximately 80 miles northeast of Bombay, where they were turned over to the command of Lord Mountbatten (who had just been named Supreme Commander of Southeast Asia) for intensive commando training. When this was completed they were moved to Deogargh, approximately 75 miles southwest of Agra. Here they were trained in Burma jungle fighting by Brigadier Wingate who had commanded the successful penetration of Burma in early 1943. In December 1943, the plans for a long-range penetration into Burma under British command were discarded and other formulated involving a quick thrust with a highly mobile striking force to drive the Japanese out of north Burma and seize the airfield at Myitkyina as a base for future operations.

The Ledo Road had been completed as far as Shingbwiyang and would be extended to Mogaung and Myitkyina to connect with the old Burma Road to China as the territory became cleared of the enemy.

The unit comprised approximately 3,000 troops and was placed under the command of General Frank Merrill. In January 1944, it was transferred via rail to Margherita, a trip requiring ten day. There was accomplished final re-equipping for the move into Burma. Each man carried an automatic or semi-automatic weapon—an M-1, a tommy gun, a Browning automatic rifle, or a carbine. Even the chaplains and the first aid men carried carbines. The unit was also equipped with light and heavy machine guns, 60 and 81 mm mortars, bazookas, and flame throwers, most of which were carried on approximately 750 pack animals, half of them American mules and the other half Australian horses. The horses were supplied at the last moment in substitution for a shipment of mules that was sunk in the Bay of Bengal just prior to the unit’s departure. Supply was to be entirely by air as was also evacuation of casualties. Aerial reconnaissance and tactical air support would be provided whenever feasible.

The unit started its shake-down march up the Ledo Road on February 7, 1944. It was divided into three battalions; “A” Battalion which was made up of veterans from Panama, commanded by Lt. Col. Osborne, veteran of bataan; “B” Battalion, principally veterans of Panama, under Lt. Col. McGee, who had commanded troops in Panama; “C” Battalion, composed of veterans of the Southwest Pacific, commanded by Lt. Col. Beech, veteran of Guadalcanal. Colonel Charles Hunter was General Merrill’s Chief of Staff. When they reached Shingbwiyang, 115 miles distant, after 10 nights of marching, the force numbered only 2700 men, 300 of the original having fallen out due to physical disabilities, malaria, and amoebic dysentery. They continued 25 miles farther east to Ningbeyen, in Jap territory, where fine plans were made for the campaign. “D” Day for the capture of Myitkyina airfield was set as May 12, 1944.

The Battalions made a wide sweep to the East, mopping up enemy t=outposts in route’ and joined with the enemy in their first major engagement at Walabum on 4th March.

“C” Battalion made the initial contact with the enemy garrison, then estimated at approximately 450. Headquarters of the 18th Japanese Division was at Shingban, north of Maingkwan. The attack by the Americans at Walabum forced the Japanese command to withdraw their forward elements who were actively engaged with the American-trained Chinese units at Taro and Taipei Ga. In the ensuing four days the enemy garrison at Walabum was augmented by these elements withdrawn from the North. Simultaneously, the enemy units withdrawing from the North were followed down the road by the Chinese, including a light tank unit equipped with American tanks. The Japanese were forced to withdraw from Walabum on March 8, 1944, leaving 885 dead comrades behind. Casualties of “C” Battalion were three killed and eight wounded. The American units were withdrawn and the Chinese were assigned the task of pursuing the retreating enemy.

After a two-day rest “A” Battalion was assigned the task of making a sweep to the East and then to the Southwest to attack the 18th Division’s hew Headquarters at Shadazup. “B” and “C” Battalions were to make a wider sweep to the East and thence farther southwest to cut enemy communications and supply lines at Inkangahtawng, above Kamaing. Enemy outposts and patrols were encountered en route and successfully disposed of. Below Shadazup “A” Battalion put in a road block which they held for two days; accomplished their mission, inflicting a heavy toll upon the enemy. “B” and “C” Battalions put in a successful road block below Inkangahtawng. They withstood two days of heavy artillery fire; destroyed bridges, communications, and numerous trucks along the road; and inflicted many casualties on the enemy before they withdrew.

At Manpin, General Merrill received intelligence to the effect that an enemy column and two reinforced battalions with artillery were proceeding along the road from Mogaung to Tumbongka to Warong, which commanded the ridge of mountains and the American’s only escape route to the East. General Merrill elected to withdraw east immediately to head off the enemy at Warong. A forced march was made on which the Dumbanghka River was crossed, waist and neck deep, 49 times in 15 miles, and the 3,500-foot ridge of mountains scaled. Advance elements of the American units reached Warong just in time to contact forward elements of the enemy. The American platoons held off the enemy column until the entire American column gained the crest of the ridge. Brought under heavy artillery fire, the American advance platoons were forced to retire to Auche; the main body withdrawing to Nhpun Ga. Again under heavy artillery fire and threatened with envelopment, the American forward elements withdrew to Nhpun Ga. General Merrill elected to hold Nhpun Ga wit “B” Battalion; and dispatched “C” Battalion five miles north to Hsamshingyang, to protect “B” Battalion’s rear. Meanwhile “A” Battalion was fighting its way down (South) from Shadazup against isolated Japanese resistance and extremely difficult terrain. On March 28th the enemy made contact with “B” Battalion at Nhpun Ga, and within 24 hours completed successfully its envelopment. Heavy enemy artillery fire from Kauri (three miles south of Nhpun Ga) poured into the small area occupied by “B” Battalion on the crest of the ridge at Nhpun Ga. Many costly attempts were made to break through the Japanese lines and join “C” Battalion at Hsamshingyang but all failed. Casualties from counterattacks and artillery fire were heavy. General Merrill ordered “C” Battalion to fight its way up the train and establish contact with “B”. Shortly thereafter General Merrill fell ill with an attack of Coronary Thrombosis and it was necessary to evacuate him immediately to the hospital at Ledo. Colonel Charles Hunter assumed command.

During their siege at Nhpun Ga it was necessary to supply “B” Battalion by air with food, ammunition, medical supplies, and even water. Two 75 mm pack howitzers were dropped to “C” Battalion at Hsamshingyang; and they successfully fought up the trail to Nhpun Ga, breaking through the enemy envelopment on April 10th.

Tactical air support during this operation was supplied by the 311th Fighter Group who were equipped with A-36’s and P-51’s, with as many as 40 sorties daily, and also by the 80th Fighter Group. They bombed and strafed enemy bunker and pillbox positions as close as 50 yards from the American positions with only one American casualty resulting from a ricocheting 50 caliber bullet. “B” Battalion was withdrawn to Hsamshingyang and “C” Battalion took over their positions.

“B” Battalion had suffered approximately 40 killed and 135 wounded, plus half of their pack animals killed. “C” Battalion had approximately 10 killed and 20 wounded. Enemy casualties were estimated at approximately 1000. On April 12th, “A” Battalion reach Hsamshingyang for rest and re-equipping. On April 28th the three American Battalions moved northward to Taikri, were joined by the 41st and 42nd Chinese Regiments; and began the march of=ver the Kumon Mountain range (elevation 8,500 feet) to Myitkyina. “A” and “C” Battalions, which ere then of approximately 700 strength each, plus the Chinese, were dispatched over the trail leading to Ripping. The remnants of “B” Battalion, numbering only 400, were dispatched over the trail to Head Ga and to Arang to destroy enemy outposts in route.

At Ritpong “C” Battalion made contact with enemy estimated to be a reinforced company. After two days of fighting, “A” Battalion withdrew and joined “B” Battalion at Arang. “C” Battalion destroyed the enemy at Ritpong, and proceeded to Tingkrukawng where they again made contact with two reinforced companies of enemy plus the remnants of the Ritpong garrison. After three days of fighting at Tingkrukawng, “” Battalion received instructions to withdraw, leaving one company of Chinese to hold the trail junctions to the West and south. “C” Battalion was to join “A” and “B” Battalions, plus the Chinese units at Weighing, for regrouping, re-equipping and final assault upon Myitkyina. Upon reaching Seingheing on May 17th, “C” Battalion received word that “B” Battalion was still one day’s march north and that “A” Battalion had already proceeded to the Myitkyina area, had seized the Southwest airstrip at Pamati, noon of May 17th, 1945, after destroying a company of enemy who were holding the field. “C” Battalion proceeded immediately on a forced march to the Myitkyina area and established a road block at Radhapur, which was the junction of road going north to Nsopzup and west to Mogaung, to prevent enemy reinforcements reaching Myitkyina.

After seizing Myitkyina airfield “A” Battalion cleared the strip of obstacles and within two hours transports landed bringing two battalions of Combat Engineers, two regiments of Chinese, plus necessary engineering equipment, food, medical supplies and ammunition. “C” Battalion held the road block at Radapur until May 30th despite heavy counterattacks and enemy infiltration. “B” Battalion had proceeded on May 19th to establish a road block at Namkwi. On May 19th two regiments of Chinese were ordered to occupy the town of Myitkyina.

Malaria, amoebic dysentery and mite-borne typhus began to take their toll of Americans. The two battalions of Combat Engineers took over the positions at Radapur and along the railroad west of Myitkyina. General Boatner assumed command of the American units in the Myitkyina area. By June 5th, approximately 90 percent of the 1300 men remaining of the original American unit had to be evacuated because of serious illness, to hospitals at Ledo and Margherita. The Combat Engineers were untried in combat and inexperienced in fighting the Japanese, and they fell victim to all of the usual Japanese tricks. Their losses were heavy and the situation became critical. An order from Myitkyina was sent to the officers in command of the hospitals at Ledo and Margherita to send every available Merrill’s man who could walk to Myitkyina. Deaths had been many from typhus, a 40 per cent mortality rate among typhus victims. Morale was very low. It was this incident that gave rise to the unfortunate publicity concerning the unit in American newspapers.

It is noteworthy that Merrill’s Marauders (53078 Composite Unit) fought in seven major engagements and 35 minor ones; marched 787 miles over most difficult terrain, including jungle, swamps, and three mountain ranges; and seized their objective within five days of the date scheduled 3^1/2 months before. Of the 100-day campaign more than 60 days were spent in destroying the enemy. It is significant that the much-vaunted 18th Japanese Division, the captors of Nanking, Singapore, and Burma, ceased to be a fighting unit of any consequence after the conclusion of General Merrill’s campaign. It is estimated that more than 10,000 casualties were inflicted upon the enemy. The contributions of the 311th Fighter Group, 80th Fighter Group, 2nd Troop Carrier Command and the 71st Liaison Squadron, who provided tactical, supply support and evacuation of casualties, were a major factors in the successful conclusion of the campaign.

Source: *Merrill’s Marauders by 1st Lt. Lawrence Paulson, 0-494062, Air Liaison Officer, now Capt. Paulson, Asst. A-2, Hq., Tenth Air Force

Merrill's Marauders

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